Soviet Targets in Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970)
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Abstract

This research deals with the interests of the Soviet Union in documenting the Egyptian-Soviet relations after the revolution of July 1952. During that time, Egypt had a strong influence on the entire region and the documentation of cultural and military relations and cultural and intellectual exchange and its impact on reducing the presence of Western influence in Egypt and strengthening the Soviet presence in the Middle East. This study aims to clarify the Soviet goals in Egypt in the period after the revolution of July 1952 until the end of the rule of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The study is followed the descriptive analytical method to study those Soviet goals in the Middle East during the rule of President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Soviet-Egyptian relations and the constant endeavor of the Soviet Union to strengthen its relationship in the Middle East and reduce Western influence and to replace it with the Soviet influence and presence in the Middle East.
1- Introduction

There were goals of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, the basis of which was to support the Soviet presence in the Middle East, as Egypt was the official sponsor of Arab unity since President Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed the position of President of the Republic since 1956.

We find that the Soviet Union had begun to abandon the communist parties in Egypt when it found that the communist parties in Egypt would be a reason to obstruct closer relations with President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the Arab nation, and the consequent loss of its presence in the Middle East and Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq. And the Soviet Union began to support revolutionary Arab leaders, such as President Gamal Abdel Nasser, when he found his anti-Western, his adoption of socialist thought and his anti-capitalist, and this was the goal that the Soviet Union sought, which is the elimination of Western influence in the Middle East. The Soviet Union changed its support and support for communist movements in Egypt and the Arab countries, and this was a confusing question, despite the Soviet Union's embrace of communism and its establishment on communist foundations, this study tried to answer it.

This study relied on unpublished documents and reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to clarify the Soviet Union’s endeavor to limit Western influence in the region in several ways, including cultural influence. Abdel Naser

2- The Literature Review

One of the most important previous studies on the subject of the research is a master’s thesis by Ibrahim Saqr at the Faculty of Economics, Cairo University, “Arab-Soviet Relations 1958-1968. The importance of this study is that it shows the beginning of the consolidation of the Soviet Union’s relationship with the Middle East and deals with it in detail.

As well as a master's thesis by researcher Kamal Mohamed Hussein entitled Egyptian-Soviet Relations 1943-1962, which dealt with the Egyptian-Soviet relations and cultural goals in Egypt

3- The Aims of the Study:

Studying the Soviet goals in Egypt and the extent of their impact in reducing Western influence and making Egypt able to take the decision to rely on itself and not only the West. The research will deal with the Soviet goals in Egypt since Gamal Abdel Nasser became president in 1956 and the manifestations of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation and the beginning of the flourishing of cooperation in various fields, all of which serve the idea of strengthening Soviet influence in the region and weakening Western influence (England and the United States of America), and also deals with the change of the Soviet political position towards communist movements in Egypt in order to improve relations with leader Gamal Abdel Nasser to achieve Soviet goals in the region.
4- Importance of the Study:

The importance of studying backs to the importance of international relationship between Egypt and Russian federation and old goals of soviet in Middle East since 1952

4.1. The Soviet goals in Egypt during the era of the President Gamal Abdel Nasser:

There is no doubt that the main objectives of the soviet union in the region is political and military goals, and therefore other objectives are essentially branching out meaning that the work to achieve them is aimed at promoting military and political objectives, and cultural goals are by their nature closer to political goals than to economic ones. In particular, it can be said that cultural diplomacy has been aimed at two main purposes, namely reducing the prevailing indulgence and replacing it with influence and soviet cultural unification.2

In fact, the Soviet Union did not care much about fate of communists in the Arab countries or even about communism as an ideology in these countries, nevertheless the ideological question remained linked to Soviet politics for several reasons. The soviet union therefore believes that other advantages can be gained from the communist movement's exercise of its role in supporting soviet interests and with the recognition of Moscow's leadership of the international communist movement, local communist leaders were more likely to support the soviet union than noncommunist leaders would on the whole to be anti-western and generally reflect the soviet goal of limiting western influence in the region. Historically, the fate of the local communists and the local communist movements seems justified Indeed, reform minded groups often pursue a policy independent of soviet union when it came to power. The soviets were thus destined to support such groups when the burden of such support isn't detrimental to other soviet objectives. This stance by soviets appeared to be a constant feature of soviet politics, and there are no signs that Arab communism did not exist or the Soviet Union has never associated itself with it. One of the important reasons why soviets faced such a dilemma may be in some cases the conflict between China and the Soviet Union in the international communist movement, which forced the Soviet Union to be reluctant to distance itself from supporting these parties. Thus, the soviets embraced a number of different policies in an attempt to reduce the differences between the Arab communists and the Arab national leaders and at the same time they sought to take advantage of these parties to support the soviet policies in the Arab world. This behavior or the double dealing method involved enormous contradictions.3

4.2. The transition from a state of national democracy to socialism

The transition from a state of national democracy to socialism takes place without violence. As one Soviet writer said, one of the tasks of this state is to facilitate the way for the implementation of socialist changes in the future in a peaceful, non-bloody way, without armed conflict and civil war. In this regard, the state of national democracy is different from the dictatorship of the Rolita, and nationalism, which was condemned in its European nature, has become seen as a progressive force in this country. It is wrong to

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2 ردما عوض برفهائي بعنوان "العلاقات المصرية الروسية من عبدالناصر والسيسي" جريدة صوت الامامة، 11 سبتمبر 2017، الصفحة الرئيسيه .

3 دالين ألكسندر, "الدوميكيكينس سوق شويت فورجن پولیسي " تي سيري، بالدورا: كوكلوند، وست- ويو في ديس كوت داسطور، إنك 1981، بيس 357.
underestimate the role it played in national liberation and the formation of modern, independent states.

However, we find that the Soviet writers have distinguished between the progressive aspects of "international nationalism", which is a tool in the struggle against tribalism, and the type of tribalism which they have seen growing among the employed classes. Imperialism exploits them in order to serve its goals of maintaining colonial domination over these countries, regardless of what the new theory has implied in the past, a number of innovations. First of all, the Communists make room for the national bourgeoisie to play their progressive role, as long as they are not aligned with the West and aspire to achieve economic independence and social reform. On the other hand, with regard to the role to be assigned to labor unions, it means a change in the direction to be drawn by the Marxist-Leninist theory and a renewal that was never present in this theory before under this new theory or formula, these unions can accomplish the tasks normally defined for the Communist Party in addition to what the new theory has recognized, the possibility for the Communists to take power in this country by peaceful means. The conception of national democracy in some respects may resemble that of popular democracy in Europe as a conceptual framework, as both aimed at creating a theoretical framework to justify the new Soviet policy, although the fundamental difference between them is that the leadership in popular democracy is achieved or guaranteed, while the problem of the leadership as a whole in national democracy is unclear.

Despite the innovations introduced by this new formula, not even the governments that the Soviets called progressive in the early 1960s, such as Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, allowed communist parties to be formed or operated in public. Their leaders began to develop what they considered their own brand of socialism. The Soviets angered them, favoring not pushing the idea of independent communist parties and recognizing that those countries were following socialism.

Instead of talking about the countries of national democracy, they started referring to the countries of revolutionary democracy and acknowledging that the non-communist government initiated policies which they themselves believed before the communist regime was the only one able to bring in (Russia). The Soviet writers started saying that the communists do not need to form independent parties and that they should cooperate with the one-party systems existing in the third world countries.

For example, the communist regime in Cuba evolved, which led to the deletion of the national democratic stage. Castro declared that the Cuban regime is a socialist system under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party. Almost all Afro-Asian countries, which were filled with Soviet experts, turned to left-wing states with one party that did not allow for communist competition. The position on these regimes, and what it implies for the communist world movement, became an important weight in the Chinese-Soviet conflict between 1963-1966. It was necessary to find a new formula, which was evident in the vision of revolutionary democracy, which was sometimes led by Soviet experts, in cooperation with individuals as a national political force, not as an organization, but as an organization, and this was the case in Egypt and Syria at the time.
The new term was used after 1963 to describe progressive leaders in developing countries struggling for their country's social progress, to establish close ties with the Soviet Union and its allies, and to justify economic and political support for the country while withholding ideological support.

Indeed, Cuba's experience has convinced Moscow that the road to socialism in these countries does not have to go through the Communist Party, and then wonder why it does not help. Do the revolutionary groups of nations going in the same direction? Some describe Nasser as the representative of the national bourgeoisie rather than the peasants who make up the majority of Egypt's population or the workers and the Anglo-American (the cultured elite). Some see the officers in power as militaristic and assert their popular origins (it is said that the theory of national democracy, which indicates that with the increasing influence of the Communists in the National Front, the regime that he embraces will turn to the left and was represented in Egypt, but was accompanied by the persecution of the Communists, is it not reasonable that the communist efforts will be more effective in turning the regime into a socialist or a communist collaborator or even a member of the ruling party to influence its policies rather than the regime's internal members, and it seems to have an influence on its policies The Cuban experience, the rise of Qassem in Iraq and the refusal to allow communist participation in national democratic systems have convinced some Soviet writers that the small bourgeoisie and even the bourgeois leaders themselves may be turning to the side of the proletariat. The prominent Soviet expert, Georgimersky, was the first to develop the role of the national bourgeoisie and stressed7 that it can at times go beyond its class nature, and to enter from reforms what was believed in the past to be possible only under the proletarian leadership, and it was not until February 1963 that he was able to clearly present the new theory about the revolutionary leadership of the small bourgeoisie and its ability to carry out non-bourgeois reforms and seek to build socialism through the non-capitalist path of development. He said, for the first time, that the leaders of the United Arab Republic are democratic revolutionaries capable of turning the anti-colonial revolution into an anti-capitalist revolution. From February to November 1963, Mersky and others continued to try to move their point forward. It was clear that Khruhe agreed with the approach that John

There were some ideologues who opposed an American who was responsible for relations with communist parties outside the communist. Their point of view was that the political and social reforms implemented in 1961 in the United Arab Republic constituted a blow to the medium and large bourgeoisie, but they could be described as anticapitalist, and that they are not capable of transcending the framework of state capitalism, and that the transition to socialism can only be achieved under the leadership of the working class. Their other criticism focused on the persecution of local communists and the swaying foreign policy of the leaders of third world countries.

The culmination of the consensus with the revolutionary democratic leaders was in the spring of 1964 when Khrushchev visited the United Arab Republic. The friendly

treatment of the new leaders was the last straw in the process of ideological change. Khrushchev took off the title of comrade Abdul Nasser, and won the Order of the Hero of the Soviet Union, which had never been awarded to non-communists. This new position on the national bourgeoisie means that the transition to socialism can take place without the communist leadership. This position also means that some national bourgeoisie systems have been considered progressive, despite the fact that they banned communist organizations. This is why some of them could immediately break the framework of the bourgeois revolution and begin the transition to the socialist revolution, despite the immature conditions for the proletarian leadership. The historical mission of breaking down capitalism can be performed by elements close to the working class. Moreover, this position means that ideology is not the most important factor in assessing the progressive nature of these regimes. The class content of any revolution is determined only by its social and economic content. Furthermore, communist experts have noted that the economic reforms witnessed in these countries were more radical than the theories, and more so that the younger officers and lower ranks should not look at them. It was even said that the bourgeois leaders would gradually shift to the side of the Socialists and the working class, which meant a fundamental retreat from the theory of the national democratic state.

4.3. The changed Soviet political system in Middle East

It was thus clear that Soviet leaders had decided that the best way to maintain an increase in Soviet influence, at least in revolutionary countries, was by infiltrating national parties from the Communist side as individuals. This approach was followed in Algeria, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana (until 1966, Guinea, and Mali until the overthrow of Quetta in 1968).

Despite the relative success of the Soviets in implementing this policy, they found that the internal political instability in many of these countries threatens the continuation of their policy. In less than ten years, four leaders (Ben Bella, Nkrubia, Soekarno and Keita) were overthrown. The Soviets realized then the policy of relying on medical relations with a sole leader with a charismatic (charismatic) popularity. They began to encourage the formation of vanguard parties that would be able to maintain the revolutionary policies of individual leaders even if they disappeared from the political life of their country. The Shiite interpretation of the fall of Nirkuma (the Ghanaian leader) confirmed, for example, the lack of a Vanguard Party capable of mobilizing the masses to defend themselves. Egyptian cannot act as a politically conscious vanguard.

Socialist development is not conceived without a party or ideological work among the masses, and this is what the Egyptian revolution needs, because the Socialist Union and the middle segment that produced its leadership do not have a socialist program of action, and they are driven only by pure nationalist ideals. Khrushchev's contributions to
the renewal of Soviet relations with Third World countries marked by a new realism and a more complex set of Soviet trends toward these countries. His removal signaled the decline of the wave of optimism, and gave way to an alternative wave of increased awareness of these countries' internal problems. After Soviet experts boasted with full confidence in 1962 that conditions would be better in the short term.\(^\text{12}\)

5. **Conclusion**

The Soviet Union did not care much about the fate of communists in the Arab countries. The Soviet Union therefore believes that other advantages can be gained from the Communist movement's exercise of its role in supporting Soviet interests. the Soviet goals in Egypt and the extent of their impact in reducing Western influence and making Egypt able to take the decision to rely on itself and not only the West.\(^\text{13}\) All of which serve the idea of strengthening Soviet influence in the region and weakening Western influence (England and the United States of America), and also deals with the change of the Soviet political position towards communist movements in Egypt in order to improve relations with leader Gamal Abdel Nasser to achieve Soviet goals in the region.

6. **Results of study**

Through the study, the following can be reached:

The Soviet Union sought to strengthen international relations with Arab countries and Egypt during the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The main goal of the Soviet Union is to reduce Western influence in the Middle East, spread communist ideology, and have centers supporting it.

The Soviet contributions and military support to Egypt during the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser after the 1967 setback, and this helped in the presence of a strong side by a superpower such as the Soviet Union supporting Egypt.

Aiming to strengthen military and political relations to create a kind of cultural diplomacy, reduce Western influence and replace it with Soviet influence and cultural unification.


\(^{13}\) Dallin, Alexander, " The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy , in Deweryn Bialer (Ed.) , op. cit., pp. 366.

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